What is the Question ?
haha
Cloning a Barracuda 6 cyl or CHallenger 6 cyl into an AAR Cuda OR TA challenger and selling it to gain more money is it legal?
Or installing a Hemi and calling it a Hemi Cuda or a Hemi Challenger and selling it to gain more money.
I also had my AAR dash pad restored.....as did my son on his Barracuda. We replaced the rivets with correct resto rivets.......
The cars were in our garage while the dash was being refurbished.........
I guess if they (police) wanted to they could go to all restoration shops and confiscate the vehicle
with VIN dash missing, thought you have it secured at home until the restoration is completed.
I would surmise they ( police ) would be looking for stolen vehicles. THey could call in the VIN and get immediate validation from MVA.
The VIN on the Dash is the birth certificate of the vehicle and the stamp numbers on body are the DNA to the Dash VIN.I don't think the fender vin would get you in trouble if missing.
The fender tag is the DNA showing the special order or options.
Here are cites to individual state laws and cases:
JURISDICTIONAL TABLE OF CASES and STATUTES
New York:
The court held in People v. Giese, 95 Misc. 2d 792, 408 N.Y.S.2d 693 (Sup 1978), order aff'd without published op, 68 A.D.2d 1019, 414 N.Y.S.2d 947 (2d Dep't 1979), that federal law (Federal Safety Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1381 et seq. (Repl.; see 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 30101 et seq.)) did not preempt N.Y. Penal Law § 170.70,
which makes it illegal to possess a VIN that has been removed from a vehicle or vehicle part to which the VIN was affixed by the manufacturer in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Motor Vehicle and Information Cost Savings Act. The court noted that the promulgation of the safety standards cannot be said to be so pervasive of the area to prevent the state of New York from enacting and enforcing laws with respect to the illegal possession of VIN plates in order to reduce the incidence of motor vehicle theft. Consequently, the court held that such legislation was not in conflict with the purpose or language of the Federal Safety Act. Maryland: In interpreting Md. Ann. Code art. 66 1/2, § 73 (1957), which prohibits a person from knowingly possessing or selling a vehicle or vehicle part with an altered or removed VIN, for the purpose of concealing or misrepresenting the identity of the vehicle or vehicle part, the court in Greenway v. State, 8 Md. App. 194, 259 A.2d 89 (1969), concluded that "knowingly" as used in the statute means "having knowledge."
A person thus may be found to have knowledge by evidence establishing that one has actual or direct knowledge of the VIN removal or alteration. For example, explained the court, actual knowledge is when one removes or alters the number personally, while direct knowledge is when one admits to knowing that the number has been removed or altered, and has no reasonable nonculpable explanation as to why it has been removed or altered. Missouri:
The court in State v. Smith, 972 S.W.2d 476, 107 A.L.R.5th 791 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1998), held that the plain language of Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 301.390.1, 301.390.6 (1994) does not require criminal intent when selling a vehicle with an altered or removed VIN. The statute's language prohibits a person from selling or offering for sale, or knowingly having the custody or possession of a motor vehicle with an altered or removed VIN. The court said that the legislature clearly and deliberately wrote the statute so that "knowingly" refers only to the crime of custody or possession, and not to the crime of selling or offering for sale. The requirement that the defendant know the VIN was altered or removed in order to be convicted thus applies only to the crime of custody or possession, and not to the crime of sale.
Delaware: In Tackett v. State, 416 A.2d 1225 (Del. 1980), the court held that two statutes: (1) the possession of a vehicle with a removed VIN (Del. Code Ann. tit. 21, § 6709); and (2) the possession of a vehicle with knowledge that the VIN is falsified with intent to misrepresent the identity (Del. Code Ann. tit. 21, § 6705(d)) were not unconstitutionally vague. The court noted that the standard for judging the certainty of a criminal statute is whether it is specific enough to give notice to a person of ordinary intelligence of the conduct prohibited. Consequently, the court found Del. Code Ann. tit. 21, § 6705(d) clearly comports with constitutional standards of specificity in that the statute unambiguously describes both the conduct prohibited and the requisite states of mind. The court also found that Del. Code Ann. tit. 21, § 6709 was not vague as applied to this case because the indictment charged that the defendant knew of the altered VINs; the defendant was in the auto repair business and a former employee of a major automaker, giving rise to a fair inference that he was familiar with confidential VINs; and the defendant's knowledge that the VINs had been altered was charged and proven.
Knowledge found: The courts in the following cases held that the defendant knowingly altered or removed a vehicle identification number (VIN) or sold or possessed a vehicle or vehicle part knowing it had an altered or removed VIN.
Georgia:
In Martin v. State, 160 Ga. App. 275, 287 S.E.2d 244 (1981), the court found that a man who rebuilt and sold a vehicle with parts containing altered or removed VINs knowingly concealed or misrepresented the identity of the vehicle under Ga. Code Ann. § 68-9916(a). Since the Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act requires that the certificate of title for any vehicle that has been rebuilt, reconditioned, or remanufactured must so state on the face of the title, and the certificate of title that the man obtained for the vehicle did not disclose on its face that the vehicle had been rebuilt, the court found there was enough evidence to conclude that he knew the vehicle contained an altered or removed VIN.
The court in Ramey v. State, 239 Ga. App. 620, 521 S.E.2d 663 (1999), denied a directed verdict of acquittal when the court found enough circumstantial evidence that the car dealer sold the stolen vehicle knowing it had an altered VIN, which is prohibited under Ga. Code Ann. § 40-4-22(a). Because the car's true VIN was damaged and then concealed, and a false VIN plate applied loosely to the door, changes that a person in the business of buying and selling cars should have noticed, and the VIN stamped on the false plate and used by the dealer for the bill of sale did not match the car and could not have been assigned to that year vehicle, the court found sufficient evidence to show the dealer had guilty knowledge of the altered VIN.
Illinois:
Enough circumstantial evidence was found by the court in People v. Kilgore, 33 Ill. App. 3d 557, 338 N.E.2d 124 (2d Dist. 1975), to sustain the defendant's conviction under Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 95 1/2, P 4-103(b) (1973), for knowingly possessing a vehicle with an altered or removed VIN. The court found that the combination of circumstances, which included the payment of $ 500 for a car valued at more than $ 2,000; the falsified VIN on the bill of sale in defendant's possession; the defendant's explanation that he purchased a burned out car and added value thereafter, which was refuted by the actual condition of the car; the fact the defendant did not present invoices or receipts corroborating his story that he bought parts to repair the car; and his failure to complete the title application or apply for plates in the time available, supported the conviction.
Kansas: In State v. Holland, 141 Kan. 307, 40 P.2d 469 (1935), the court held there was enough evidence to uphold a conviction of possessing a vehicle, whose VIN was altered or removed in violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-116(b). The evidence included testimony of the VIN alteration or removal, which showed that several VINs had been ground off and other VINs were stenciled on. In addition, it was found that the defendant had been in the possession of the vehicle for 15 months and therefore had enough time to gain knowledge of the change in the numbers.
Massachusetts: In Com. v. Perreault, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 1072, 435 N.E.2d 635 (1982), the court found was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of violating Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 266, § 139(b)-(c), which prohibits the possession or sale of a vehicle or vehicle part knowing the VIN has been altered or removed. Because the defendant testified that the true VIN numbers were no longer on the cars and an auto theft investigator testified as to what the VINs were as they appeared on the stolen vehicles and what the VINs should have been, the court concluded that the Commonwealth satisfied its burden of proving that the defendant knew the vehicles had altered or removed VINs.
Ohio: In State v. Halczyszak, 1990 WL 32605 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. Cuyahoga County 1990), the court upheld a conviction under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4549.62(D)(1), after it was found that salvage yard owners knowingly possessed a vehicle in which the VIN was altered. The court found that the case record revealed that the owners knowingly and purposely altered the body of an older vehicle by attaching the VIN from a newer vehicle. In addition, one of the salvage yard owners further demonstrated this knowledge by stating to the police that she believed they could transfer the VIN from one car to another.
